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"If every speaker who has talked in the last
twenty years or so about federal-state relations in water
law were laid end to end, it would be a good and merciful
thing . . . [w]hatever the hue and stripe of his
persuasions . . . everyone, I suspect, has reached a common
conclusion.

Federal-state relations are not satisfactory."
Charles E. Corker, Professor of Law,
University of Washington
School of Law (July, 1971).

"That a gurgling stream, from whose shady depths
occasionally a silver fish flashes and a variety of
indistinct furry heads take furtive sips is not an integral
part of the forest through which it winds, is a thought
which would never occur to a poet, [or] a small boy . . . ."
Walter Kiechel, Jr.,
Attorney at Law
(October, 1976)

11
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DISCLAIMER

Though I am employed by the U.S.D.A. Forest Service
and am involved with securing and administering federal
water rights, this professional paper has been prepared
totally outside my official capacity.

I believe that my

professional experience, combined with my work in Montana
water law and politics as a graduate student in Environmental
Studies at the University of Montana, have afforded me a
knowledge (and appreciation) of both the federal and state
perspective.

The opinions and conclusions developed in

this paper are not necessarily those of the U.S.D.A. Forest
Service.

Ill
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I.

INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES

As Professor Corker laments (frontpiece), few topics
have been discussed in such quantity, for so long, with such
vigor, and with such lack of progress as federal-state rela
tions in water law.

This paper was undertaken only because

the State of Montana is approaching the problem in a new and
potentially precedent-setting manner.

The purpose of the

paper is to document the potential opportunities and
problems associated with the ongoing federal/state/tribal
water rights compact negotiations in Montana.

Although

negotiations between federal and state governments and
Indian tribes have been used sparingly in the past for
settling site-specific water rights disputes, Montana’s
statewide negotiation process, in conjunction with general
water rights adjudications,
nation.

is the first of its kind in the

The principal questions to be investigated in this

paper are:
1)

Does the negotiation process offer a significant
potential to resolve the conflicts and uncertainties
related to the need for quantification of federal
(and Indian) reserved water rights and Indian
aboriginal water rights in Montana?

-

1-
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2)

Can the process reach its legislatively-defined goal of
"concluding compacts for the equitable division and
apportionment of waters between the State and its people,
the several Indian tribes, and the agencies of the
Federal government claiming reserved water rights
within the State
The compact negotiation process is just started, and

may take several years to complete.

Little can now be

concluded with confidence about it.

Yet, there are some

advantages in documenting the issues and the process itself
now, in its early stages.

If it is successful, other

western states might profit from a discussion of its goals
and early problems and successes.

Also, many of the

participants and observers in the Montana effort do not yet
fully understand the issues involved.

An objective of this

paper is to document, as succinctly as possible, the
origins and current status of these issues.

The paper will

endorse the position, for example, that Indian water rights
and those of federal agencies, though interrelated, are
sufficiently distinct to be considered separately in compact
negotiations.
Another objective of this paper is to examine the
principles, or elements, of a successful negotiated
settlement.

There must be, for example, clear advantages

for both sides before an agreement can be reached.

There

^Montana Code Annotated (MCA), Title 85, Chapter 2,
701-704.
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must also be a willingness to compromise.

Once the elements

are identified, the question of whether they are present in
the Montana compact negotiation process will be explored.
Potential obstacles to a successfully negotiated settlement
will be identified and discussed within that context.
The final, and perhaps most important, objective of
this paper is to contribute to the success of the Montana
compact negotiation process by defining and documenting
some potential "middle ground" solutions to the problem of
quantifying federal reserved water rights.

To limit the

scope of that portion of the paper, only non-Indian reserved
rights, in particular those of the U.S.D.A., Forest Service,
are considered in detail.

Recommendations are made that

reserved rights for instream water uses be recognized by the
State of Montana to the mutual benefit of both parties (and
ultimately to the public).
It is the author’s hope that this paper may be of
use to both parties in the current negotiations, perhaps in
more fully understanding the issues involved and the
position of the other side.

Similarly, it would be

gratifying if. some of the specific recommendations might
ultimately find their way into a future reserved water
rights compact between the State of Montana and the Federal
government.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

II.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Since the passage of the Water Use Act in 1973,^
the State of Montana has made significant strides toward
a comprehensive, centralized approach to water policy and
2
a statewide system of water rights records.
Rapidly
expanding energy development activities and far-reaching
plans have underscored the urgent need for Montana to
define its current and future water needs.

Some of the

largest unanswered questions deal with the role of the
Federal government and the various Indian tribes in managing
3
the limited water resources of the State.
The worst fears of state government lie with the
ill-defined federal pre-emptive powers that result from the
supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution.

It seems clear

that, if it so desires, Congress may override state policies
that limit transbasin or interstate transport of water.
In this regard, Montana must rely on a continuation of the
M o n t a n a Code Annotated, Title 85, Chapter 2.
^See R. E. Eagle, "The Politics of Water Allocation
in Montana," Montana Business Quarterly. (Autumn 1978).
3

See David Ladd, "Protecting Montana's Water :
Support for a State Water Plan," and R. E. Eagle and R. A.
Russell, "Water Rights Issues in Montana.”
-4-
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longstanding reluctance of Congress to meddle in the
traditional domain of state government in water rights
administration.
The second largest area of concern and uncertainty
relates to the extent and impacts of the judicially
defined federal reserved water rights doctrine--applicable
to federal lands such as national parks, national forests,
and to reservations held in trust for the various Indian
tribes.

Spawned in a U.S. Supreme Court case on the Fort

Belknap Indian Reservation in Montana in 1908 (Winters vs.
United States) ,

the reserved rights doctrine still lacks

much specific definition.

Federal reserved rights, which

have come to be defined as that quantity of water needed to
accomplish the purposes of the reservation, are in theory
open-ended in time.

The water need not be used until

required, and the right is not lost through nonuse.

That

aspect of the reserved right is contrary to the concept of
prior appropriation upon which most western states' laws
are predicated.
Since the purposes of most federal reservations are
not expressly stated in the documentation, it is very
difficult for a state to determine the magnitude of the
rights.

And, worst of all, federal reserved water rights

are not dependent upon state laws or procedural requirements
^Winters vs. United States. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
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for legitimacy.

Because of these features, the federal

reserved right creates substantial uncertainty over anyone's
right to use water on or near federal reservations :
We have a situation in which the federal sovereign
claims water rights which are nowhere formally listed,
which are not the subject of any decree or permit,
and which, therefore, are etheric [sic] in large part
to the person who has reason to know and evaluate the
extent of his priorities to the use of water. To
have these federal rights in a state of uncorrelated
mystery is frustrating and completely contrary to
orderly procedure . . . .^
This uncertainty threatens havoc in administering water
rights in Montana and jeopardizes the otherwise substantial
gains that have been made since 1973.
The degree of uncertainty surrounding Indian water
rights, for a variety of reasons, is substantially greater.
The landmark Yellowstone water reservation process,
completed in December 1978, did not deal with Indian rights
at all :
It has been said that the Board (Natural
Resources and Conservation) wasted its time in making
reservations (for instream and future municipal and
agricultural uses) because the Indians' water claims
are not yet settled. That may well be true for those
parts of the basin affected by the Indian water
claims . . . [and] the Board knew this all too well,
but the Board was required by State law and the
Montana Supreme Court to complete its task by a certain

Walter J. Kiechel and Kenneth J. Burke, "FederalState Relations in Water Resources Adjudication and
Administration? Integration of Reserved Rights with
Appropriâtive Rights," in Proceedings of the Eighteenth
Annual Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute. 18 (1973):536,
quoting Colorado Supreme Court, 458 Pacific 2nd 760 at 765.
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time.
It did not have the option of waiting for the
slow legal^wheels to grind out the Indian water
decisions.
A 1978 Comptroller General's Report to Congress
concluded that the federal reserved rights problem is
causing considerable controversy and litigation,

leads to

economic and social disruption, and inhibits the efficient

8

use of scarce western water resources.

Though it has been underscored in Montana by recent
energy development plans, the problem has existed for
several decades while little real progress has been made
in solving it.

Litigation at all levels of the judicial

system has clarified some very specific points and resulted
in a minor amount of quantification of reserved rights.
But many large, key questions remain unanswered and the
vast majority of federal rights unquantified.

To date,

the courts have been the only effective forum available.
Yet the Supreme Court has only rarely addressed the subject,
9
and when it has, it has not spoken consistently or plainly.

Dr. Wilson F. Clark (member, Montana Board of
Natural Resources and Conservation), "A Free-Flowing Yellow
stone : The Reservations Challenge," Montana Outdoors. Vol.
10, No. 2, (March/April 1979), quoted in Eagle and Russell,
p . 15.
o
U.S. Comptroller General, Report to Congress on
Reserved Water Rights for Federal and Indian Reservations:
A Growing Controversy in Need of Resolution, Report fCED-78
176 (1978), p. C -104.
(Referred to hereafter as "Comptrol
ler General's Report.")
9

For a brief discussion of the development of the
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8

Though there are some who still advocate judicial determi
nation,^® the historical trend seems to indicate that
litigation is not the answer for a quick resolution of the
need to quantify federal or Indian reserved rights.
An obvious alternative to litigation would be for
Congress to clarify the reservation doctrine and require
quantification under certain legislatively determined
conditions.

Though as many as fifty bills have attempted

to do so, none have been successful.

The latest attempt,

entitled the "Reserved Water Rights Coordination Act of
1980," is expected by its sponsors to be introduced into the
United States Senate soon.

12

Similar to other state-oriented

bills before it, the bill would terminate all unexercised
federal non-Indian reserved rights, quantify and correlate

reserved rights doctrine by the U.S. Supreme Court, see U.S.,
Presidential Water Policy Task Force 5a, Report of Federal
Task Force on Non-Indian Reserved Rights Tbraft), June 1979,
pp. 6-10.
(Referred to hereafter as "Task Force 5a Report.")
For a more detailed discussion, see U.S., Department of
Interior, Solicitor's Opinion #M36914, Federal Water Rights
of the National Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service.
Bureau of Land Management, and Bureau of Reclamation.
25 June 1979.
(Hereafter referred to as "Solicitor's
Opinion.")
^®Alan E. Boles, Jr., and Charles M. Elliott,
"United States v s . New Mexico and the Course of Federal
Reserved Rights," University of Colorado Law Review 51
(Winter, 1980),215.
^^Comptroller General's Report, p. C -150.

12
C.
Roe, "Reserved Water Rights Coordination Act of
1980," (Draft of a bill proposed for introduction in U.S.
Congress), April, 1980.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

9
reserved rights with state authorized rights, strictly limit
the exercise of Indian reserved rights, and provide for
federal compensation of junior water right holders Injured
by the exercise of federal rights.

An obvious, and

unavoidable, failing of all such proposed legislative
solutions is that their comprehensive nature necessitates
heavily favoring one of the two extreme positions.

The

complexity and diversity of the issues involved seem to
preclude a blanket legislative compromise that would be
constructive in every instance.

In the past, such compre

hensive proposals have failed "because the intense and often
antagonistic views of Indians, federal, state, and private
interests have precluded the sort of consensus that is a
precondition to Congressional action on such matters."

13

If the Roe bill is introduced, there is little reason to
believe that Congress is any more capable now of reaching
a timely and acceptable compromise than it has been in the
past.

Rather, a more case specific legislative adjudication

approach would seem more likely to succeed--as it has in the
past when other potential solutions have failed.

The most

notable example of such Congressional apportionment of
water supplies is the Boulder Canyon Project Act of
December 21, 1928--which provided for division of the waters
of the Colorado River between the upper basin states
(Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming) and the lower basin states
^^Boles and Elliott, p. 215.
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10
(California, Arizona, and Nevada) after attempts at inter
state compact negotiations had amounted to nothing.
Recently a third approach toward reaching a timely
solution to the problem--that of administrative (executive
branch) action--has been receiving considerable attention.
President Carter's water policy initiatives of June 6, 1978^^
and subsequent directives established a policy for federal
agencies to "increase the level and quality of your
attention to the identification of federal reserved water
rights and to move forward with a program for establishing
and quantifying these rights."

The policy stresses the use

of administrative means to accomplish the task.

Where

disputes arise, the President directed federal agencies to
"negotiate and settle such rights in an orderly and final
manner, seeking a balance with conflicting and established
water uses . . . .

Seek formal adjudication only as a

last resort."
The President’s water policy statement marks a new
compromise position, of sorts, in federal water rights
assertions.

In a news release dated June 23, 1979,

Secretary of the Interior, Cecil Andrus, summarized that
new position:
To my m i n d , one of the most important elements
of the President's message was his directive to use

President Carter’s Water Policy Message to Congress
(June 6. 1978), reprinted in Environmental Reporter
9:228 (1978).
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11
a 'reasonable standard' in asserting federal reserved
rights. That means asserting only those rights which
reflect our true water needs, the 'minimum' we must
have to manage federal lands as Congress has directed.
It means we must not--I repeat, not -- seek the
broadest theoretical extension of all possible legal
rights.
In a letter to western governors, Andrus went on to say that
"President Carter's directive to all federal agencies to
move promptly, in cooperation with Western States, to
quantify federal reserved rights is a marked departure from
the silence or stubborn intransigence of prior administra
tions .
On July 12, 1978, President Carter issued thirteen
directives covering various aspects of his water policy
message to Congress six days earlier.

One such directive

established a Task Force (#5a) on Federal Non-Indian
Reserved Water Rights.

A draft of the Task Force Report

issued in June, 1979 found several reasons for a lack of
progress toward quantifying federal reserved rights --among
them the fact that there has been a lack of a comprehensive
17

legal policy within and among the agencies.
still exists a year later.

That problem

In keeping with the President's

Cited in Simms, Richard A., "National Water Policy
in the Wake of United States v s . New Mexico." Natural
Resources Journal 20 (January7 1980);12.
^^U.S. Secretary of Interior, Memorandum to Governors
Scott Matheson (Utah) and Ed Herschler (Wyoming) regarding
assertion of federal water rights, 4 February 1980.
^^Task Force 5a Report, p. 19.
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12
directives, the Task Force Report recommended a policy that
"the United States should try to negotiate agreements with
each state to protect the interests of the states in
systematically identifying and administering water rights,
while protecting the interests of the United States in
18
relying on reserved rights.”
Another reason cited by the Task Force for lack of
progress was the failure of western states, with some
relatively recent exceptions, to systematically adjudicate
19
water rights within their borders.

There is a tendency

not to accept federal reserved and Indian water rights as a
fact of life.

By so doing, the states fail to provide

sensible mechanisms with which to deal with them.

All too

recently, blanket statements of denial and oversimplifi
cation have been the response of state officials.

Such

statements as "federal and Indian reserved rights do not
extend to instream uses" were common.

20

In Montana, at least, the mechanisms and intent to
adjudicate all water rights, including federal and Indian

^^Ibid., p. 46.
^^Ibid., p. 20.
20

Interstate Conference on Water Rights Problems.
Special Task Force Report on the Proposed Federal Water
Rights Legislation (February 1975). paraphrased in
Robert S. Pelcyger, "Indian Water Rights : Some Emerging
Frontiers," Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual Rocky
Mountain Mineral Law Institute. 21;754.
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13
rights, are now firmly in place with the passage of Senate
Bill 76 by the 1979. Montana legislature.

The law recognizes

that the success or failure of the effort will depend
largely on the State's ability to adjudicate federal and
Indian claims concurrently.

The legislature also established

a Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission empowered to
negotiate claims with federal and Indian officials.

21

The

primary purpose of the Commission is to establish these
claims, or a framework and timetable for quantifying the
claims, so that the planned general adjudications under the
new law will proceed more smoothly.

While negotiations for

a compact are being pursued, there is a statutory suspension
of action to adjudicate Indian and federal water rights
until July 1, 1982.^^
The Montana Reserved Rights Compact Commission,
chartered by the 1979 Montana legislative assembly, consists
of nine members --four of which are legislators (see
Appendix A).

The Commission is chaired by Henry Loble of

Helena, an attorney quite experienced in Montana and western
water law.

Two state employees, Scott Brown and David Ladd,

have been added to the staff of the Water Sciences Bureau,
Water Resources Division, Department of Natural Resources
and Conservation to assist the Commission as program manager

^^MCA, 85-2-702, 703.
^^MCA, 85-2-217.
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14
and staff attorney (respectively).

Contacts have been made

by the Commission with all Indian tribes and federal
agencies thought to claim water rights in Montana.

Active

negotiations are underway with the Confederated Salish and
Kootenai tribes and the Northern Cheyennes.

Several meetings

have been held with federal officials, but procedural items
and questions of authority have so far precluded active
23
negotiations.

23

Henry Loble, personal interview, Helena, Montana,
8 August 1980.
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III.

NATURE OF ISSUES--FEDERAL AND
INDIAN WATER RIGHTS

The Montana Reserved Water Rights Commission is
charged with two related, but distinct tasks.

The first is

negotiation with Indian tribes^ and the second is negotiation
2
with federal agencies.
Though the reserved rights of each
3
owe their existence to the "Winters Doctrine," many of the
issues involved are quite different.
All reserved right claims have certain character
istics that cause them to be troublesome to state water
administrators.

First, the claims may pre-empt state created

rights because there is as yet no requirement that the
agencies or tribes disclose the claims until they choose to
exercise them.

Reserved rights are not lost through non-use.

Secondly, the claim may extend to uses potentially broader

^MCA, 85-2-701, 702.
^MCA, 85-2-703.
3
The "Winters Doctrine" is the name given to the
judicially-created federal reserved water rights as
articulated in Winters v s . United States [207 US 564 (1908)]
and expanded through subsequent court decisions.

-15 "
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16
than those recognized as "beneficial uses" under state law.'^
The issues raised when reserved rights are asserted are :
1) was an intent (by Congressional action or Executive
Order) present?
2) how much water was available?
3) how much of the available water was actually
reserved ?^
In nearly every case, the documentation upon which those
asserting reserved water rights rely does not expressly
answer any of those three questions.

For that reason, the

judicially-created legal principle is often referred to as
the "implied reservation doctrine."

Because of the long

history of judicial support of the existence of Congressional
or Executive intent, it is appropriate to conclude,
as one observer does, that "genuine apprehension about
federal reserved water rights arises not because they are
'federal' or 'reserved', but because thay are 'implied'."^
There are no agreed upon rules, and few consistent judicial

Sally K. Fairfax and Dan A. Tarlock, "No Water for
the Woods: A Critical Analysis of United States v s . New
Mexico." Idaho Law Review 15 (Summer 1979) :521.
^ C . Steven McMurry, "Comment-Implied Reservation
Claims after Caeopaert v s . United States." Arizona State
Law Journal, 1977:655.
^Charles E. Corker, "Federal-State Relations in
Water Rights Adjudication and Administration," in Proceedings
of the Seventeenth Annual Rocky Mountain Mineral Law
Institute, 17:588.
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17
interpretations, that can be relied upon to help discover
how much water was reserved.

Two other questions, now being

raised with greater frequency, are:
1) when was the water reserved?
2) (in the case of Indians) by whom was the water
reserved?
These two questions relate to a recent tendency by both
federal agencies and Indian tribes to assert rights through
different authorities, distinct from the federal reserved
rights doctrine.

There is some question whether the Montana

Reserved Water Rights Commission has the authority to
negotiate such claims, though its Chairman believes that
it does.^
In the case of Indian tribes, increasing emphasis
is being placed on what have been termed 'aboriginal water
rights'--i.e., unextinguished rights to use water that
Indians hold as a result of its prior use by their ancestors
from time immemorial on ancestral lands still remaining in
O

Indian ownership.

By asserting these rights, the tribes

hope to sever some dependence on the federal government

7
Henry Loble, personal interview, Helena, Montana,
8 August 1980.

8

For in-depth treatments of Indian aboriginal rights,
see William H. Veeder, "Indian Prior and Paramount Rights
to the Use of Water," Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual
Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute. 16:631-668 and James L.
Merrill, "Aboriginal Water Rights,” Natural Resources
Journal 20 (January 1980):45-70.
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and its reserved water rights while taking advantage of
recent favorable federal judicial decisions concerning a
similar issue--the rights of Indians to hunt and fish on
their ancestral lands.

The concept, though generally

untested in court, has a potential to be an even bigger
threat to state control of water than Indian reserved rights.
In Montana, Northern Cheyene Tribal Resolution No. 179 (74),
dated March 25, 1974, asserts such rights as follows:
[The tribe] does hereby claim . . . that the
Northern Cheyenne Tribe is entitled and now has and
at all times had, the first, paramount and aboriginal
right to the use of all waters [flowing upon or
beneath the Reservation] . . . and hereby declares
and claims the aboriginal right to the appropriation,
use, and storage of all said waters . . . .
Though dismissed by some as an "all conquering
battle-cry of those who would recapture the birthright of
the American I n d i a n , a b o r i g i n a l water rights do appear to
have a rational and ethical basis in fact, irrespective of
the legal determinations that will be forthcoming.

They

will undoubtedly be asserted by the tribes through the
Montana negotiation process, to some as yet undeterminable
extent.

^Cited in Merrill (supra), p. 48.
^^Paul L. Bloom, "Indian 'Paramount' Rights to
Water Use," Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Rocky
Mountain Mineral Law Institute (July 9-11, 1970). 16:669
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For its part, the Federal government has recently
developed its own "non-reserved" rights theory--also
untested by the courts.

The Solicitor of the Department of

Interior found, in a legal opinion dated June 25, 1979,
that the Federal government may establish non-reserved
rights to water for "Congressionally authorized management
of unreserved lands or reserved lands for objectives apart
from the original reservation purpose(s).

Moreover, such

rights could be legally established whether or not the state
recognized its purpose as legitimate under its laws.

In

response to the furor created by western water users and
state officials, fearful of a new series of court battles
and uncertainties, Secretary of Interior Cecil Andrus
directed his agencies that there be "no blanket, across-theboard claims for non-reserved rights formally asserted,”
without his a p p r o v a l . H o w e v e r ,

in the same memorandum,

he left open the possibility that it might be necessary to
assert such rights to protect federal water needs in
situations where statutory or court deadlines exist for
comprehensive filing of all water rights.

That is the

situation in Montana, where all rights, including federal
and Indian rights, must be filed by January 1, 1982.^^
11

U.S., Secretary of Interior, Memorandum to Interior
Department agencies regarding assertion of federal water
rights, 4 February 1980.
^^MCA, 85-2-212.
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Secretary of Agriculture Bob Bergland has committed his
Department (which includes the Forest Service) to a similar
policy.
In addition to the different authorities under which
federal and Indian "non-reserved” rights may be asserted,
there are several other major reasons why Indian and
non-Indian federal rights should be considered as separate
and distinct issues.

The first of these is the fact that,

unlike most Indian reservations, federal lands tend to be
located relatively high in the watershed, and most claims
will be for non-consumptive water uses (such as instream
flows) which preserve the water for appropriation downstream
under state law.

The Task Force 5a Report found that to

be the major cause of their optimistic finding that
accommodation of federal rights to state interests "may not
be as intractable in fact as some might perceive them to be
in theory."

No such optimism can be generated for the

Indian situation, where consumptive uses, low in watershed,
will predominate.
Federal and Indian water rights are both held by
the government in trust for the people of the United States,
but in markedly different ways and with significantly
distinct implications.

Federal rights are held for the

13

U.S., Secretary of Agriculture, Memorandum to
Secretary of Interior regarding assertion of federal water
rights, 7 April 1980.
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public at large under what is termed the "public trust
d o c t r i n e . I n c u m b e n t upon the government is the responsi
bility to take into account the public nature and the quality
of water in making decisions regarding its use.

It is well

established under the law that such rights are subject to
change and diminution by the government (subject to judicial
review) if it is in the public interest.

Since members of

the public have no property rights in such water, no
compensation is due.

Of course, the public trust also

suggests that the wholesale giveaway of federal rights by the
government, to the detriment of the aquatic ecosystem or other
environments, is unreasonable and therefore illegal.

15

Indian rights, at least those existing under the
federal reservation authority, are held in trust for the
tribe and its people under a unique arrangement similar to
that of a guardian to his ward.

The government may not

simply use the public interest test to weigh the benefits
of two alternative uses of that water.

This relationship

has led the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI)
and many tribal governments to insist that "Indian water

For a discussion of the public trust doctrine,
see Felix E. Smith, The Public Trust Doctrine. Instream
Flows. and Resources. (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service-March, 1980) and Joseph Sax, "The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention,”
Michigan Law Review 68 (1970):473-566.
^^Smith, p. 2 2 .
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rights are protected by the 5th Amendment [and] [a]ny
compromise, appropriation, or expropriation of Indian water
rights . . . will entitle tribes to compensation under the
5th Amendment.

The federal government has recognized

that Indian rights are private, not public rights.
As alluded to above, the U.S. government as a
trustee to the tribes is bound to strictly protect the rights
and interests of its beneficiaries --the Indian people.

Yet

the Department of Justice is continually, and increasingly
placed into a position of conflict of interest in litigation
where it must not only protect Indian rights but also
claim federal rights of various agencies that may be totally
TO

incompatible with the Indian claims.

The Indian people

also charge that other violations of the federal trust have
been occurring when Congress has appropriated funds for
reclamation water projects on rivers in which Indians have
Winters claims without providing sufficient capital for
development of their rights.

The net result, from the

Indian perspective, is the development of junior non-Indian
1A
Albert W. Trimble (Executive Director, National
Congress of American Indians), Letter (7/10/78) to United
States General Accounting Office in response to Comptroller
General's Report to Congress.
For additional information,
see "NCAI to GAO: Legislative Quantification of Indian
Water Rights is not the Answer," American Indian Journal,
Vol. 5, No. 1, (January 1979):33-36.
^^Comptroller General's Report, p. C -113.
18

Veeder, p. 664.
See also : U.S. Congress, Joint
Economic Committee, Federal Encroachment on Indian Water
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water rights with heavy federal subsidization--a discrimina
tory action that unduly complicates future Indian water
developments.

The Federal government may also violate its

trusteeship responsibilities by failing to provide Indians
with the legal and technical assistance necessary to
participate effectively in Winters rights quantification
proceedings.
In addition to the differences in trust responsibil
ities of the federal government, Indian and other federal
reserved water rights also differ substantially as to the
purposes for which the reservations were established.

Most

non-Indian federal reservations require water mostly for
non-consumptive uses.

Traditionally,

Indian water rights

have been assumed to stem from the federal government's
desire to make farmers of the tribes --i<e., water for
agriculture.

The amount of irrigable acres has long been

used as a yardstick for quantifying Indian reserved rights.
Admittedly, agriculture was, in most cases, the
purpose for which the Congress or the President originally
set aside Indian reservations (although this purpose was
seldom expressly stated).

Yet, it has been established by

Rights and the Impairment of Reservation Development. 91st
Congress, 1st Session (1970).
19

Robert H. Abrams, "Reserved Water Rights, Indian
Rights and the Narrowing Scope of Federal Jurisdiction;
River Decision/' Stanford Law Review 30 (July
19/8;: 11145.
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the courts that, in determining the extent of implied
federal and Indian reserved rights today, the courts may
not be strictly bound to circumstances dating from the
actual reservation.

They may extrapolate the concept of

federal purpose to the present context.
In other words, the courts need not (though they
sometimes still do)

21

attempt to determine what was on the

minds of certain lawmakers back at the time of establishment
of the reservations.

That, of course, often proves to be a

massive, if not futile, undertaking--since it is difficult
enough to determine the motives of legislators on contempo
rary issues.

In the words of noted water law expert

Frank Trealease*
If this view of reserved rights were accurate
there would be some hope for the contentions of some
who would limit reserved rights to the bounds
established by the ignorance of the reservation founders.
Rather, it seems likely that intent [emphasis added]
is a presumption that if water is needed to accomplish
the purposes of a reservation as now perceived, then
enough unappropriated water was reserved to fulfill
those purposes.
There is no intent to find--the parties
simply never thought about the m a t t e r . ^2
20
McMurry, p. 670, (citing Caennaert vs. United States).
21

A recent example of where the court limited itself
strictly to a study of the intent of the legislators at the
time of reservation is United States vs. New Mexico.
22

Maxfield, Dietrich, and Trealease, "Indian Water
Rights for Mineral Development," in Natural Resources Law
on American Indian Lands. Rocky Mountain Mineral Law
Foundation (Boulder, Colorado), 1977.
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Thus, it is conceivable that modern courts could determine
that the purpose of Indian reservations is to provide
Indians equal opportunity with other Americans to achieve
whatever goals they may set for themselves.

That principle,

in fact, seems to have already been established by the
Indian Self Determination Act of 1976:
The Congress declares that a major national
goal of the United States is to permit Indians to
achieve the measure of self-determination
23
essential to their social and economic well-being.
Whether the courts will so expand the basis of Indian water
claims is purely speculation at this time.

What does seem

clear, however, is that Indians are not limited to using
their water for agricultural purposes, even though it may
be quantified on that basis.

The Supreme C o u r t ’s recent

supplemental decree in Arizona v s . California^^ stated that
"the means of determining quantity of adjudicated water
rights (of Indians) shall not constitute a restriction of
the usage of them to irrigation or other agricultural
application.

25

The discussion above points to the largest and most
pressing threat to state water users and administrators in
25 use 450-450n, 1976.
See Charles DuMars and
Helen Ingram, "Congressional Quantification of Indian Reserved
Water Rights : A Definitive Solution or a Mirage," Natural
Resources Journal 20 (January 1980):3l.
^"^439 US 419, 422 (1979).
^^Cited in Merrill, p. 67.
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Montana--the potential consumptive use of large quantities
of reserved water by Indian tribes for the development of
energy resources.

In combination with mineral rights,

these water rights make an attractive package for an outside
developer with capital, or the federal government itself.

26

In contrast, other federal reserved rights simply do not
have the potential for such disruptive consumptive uses--at
issue on federal lands is primarily instream water uses.
The Montana Reserved Water Rights Commission, then, has
two very different issues before it.

Though both are in

need of resolution, the non-Indian federal reserved rights
issue can be expected to be less complicated and more easily
resolved than the Indian issue.

^^Maxfield, et al., p. 207.
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IV.

AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE--PAST USE
OF NEGOTIATION TO QUANTIFY
RESERVED WATER RIGHTS

On the surface at least, negotiation would seem to
be the most suitable method to accommodate the variety of
conflicting interests involved in water resource planning.
Legislation has accomplished little of a comprehensive
nature, and litigation adds exponentially to the cost and
time involved in planning.

Negotiation can allow resolution

of local conflicts between environment and development
interests, and between state and federal governments
without necessarily establishing precedents.

In negotiations,

the focus is on the quantity and form of consideration
rather than on the fine points of legal argument.

The

parties merely have to agree to do something, and one party
need not even recognize the authorities under which the
other claims a right.

If a dispute can be settled by

negotiation, each party retains some control (as well as
saving time and money).

If, on the other hand, bargaining

fails and the issue goes to court, the result is not always
controllable by the participants.

The court may render a

decision that may make shambles of the planning efforts
of the agencies involved.
-27-
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In spite of the apparent advantages of negotiation
for quantifying federal reserved rights, it has not
previously been attempted for that purpose on as large a
scale as the current effort in Montana.

It has been

limited primarily to litigated, or potentially litigated
cases on a small scale.

These negotiations have generally

involved either scheduled releases of water below dams or
diversions for instream uses, or Indian participation in
water resource development projects.

For example, in

December, 1977, the Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community
and the Kennecott Copper Corporation approved an agreement
to settle a long-standing dispute over their respective
water rights in Arizona's Gila River watershed.

The

Secretary of Interior, in a news release, stated :
Anyone who has followed western water disputes -particularly in the desert southwest --can only view
this agreement as a major achievement.
I certainly
commend both parties for reaching a sensible,
mutually beneficial resolution without costly,
time-consuming court suits which might also have
seriously disrupted the state's economy.^
Though the total number of negotiated agreements
between Indian tribes and other interests is small, they
2
have taken a variety of forms.
One form is an agreement to
deferral of a reserved water right.

One such settlement

^Cited in Comptroller General's Report, p. C-159.
2
"Indian Reserved Water Rights; The Winters of Our
Discontent," Yale Law Review 88 (July 1979); 1693.
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was reached between the state of Utah and the people of the
Ute-Ouray reservation.

The tribe claimed water rights on

undeveloped lands susceptible to irrigation.

Since the

lands are not particularly good irrigable acreage, the
tribe signed an agreement (with the consent of the United
States) not to develop the lands until the year 2005.

That

in turn will permit the construction of the Bonneville
Unit of the Central Utah Project.

The project will make

water available for existing and future non-Indian uses,
without transferring Indian priorities off the reservation.
These uses will, if things go as planned, be displaced by
ultimate Indian development.

In addition, the Indians did

obtain immediate construction of some facilities needed to
3
use some of their water now.
The Ute agreement illustrates clearly that Indians
recognize the vast differences between their theoretical
rights and those that they can expect to achieve immediately.
They have made large concessions for small gains and many
promises.

It is, for them, painfully true that the right

to water does not necessarily include a right to the capital
investment necessary to realize the economic benefits of
that right.

Their bargaining position has been from a

situation of very limited economic alternatives.

The

agreements achieved, though economically advantageous, may
3
Edward W. Clyde, "Special Considerations Involving
Indian Rights," Natural Resources Lawyer 8 (1975);250.
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be at the cost of weakening the political and cultural
integrity of the tribe.^
In the case of the Ute agreement, only the future
will show the wisdom of the concessions that were made.
Another similar case can be cited to illustrate the hazards
of negotiating from a weak economic position.

It also

illustrates a second form of possible compromise--that of
shortage sharing agreements, whereby an early priority date
is waived when water is insufficient to meet all needs.

In

1962, Congress confirmed a Navajo tribal agreement in which
federal financing of a massive irrigation project on the
eastern portion of the reservation (Navajo Indian Irrigation
Project) was promised in exchange for surrender of the
Navajo priority to waters needed for the San Juan-Chama
project.

Unfortunately, the main issue for the Indians was

economics rather than the threat to their water rights--so
potential Winters rights were not ever a part of their
bargaining position.

Also, to the detriment of the tribe,

the Bureau of Indian Affairs had a strong role in the
process --relegating the tribe to ratifiera rather than
bargainers.^

As a part of the Interior Department, the

Bureau of Indian Affairs undoubtedly was hampered in its
Price and Weatherford, "Indian Water Rights in
Theory and Practice : Navajo Experience in the Colorado
River Basin,” Law and Contemporary Problems 40 (Winter,
1976); p. 100.
^Ibid., p. 115.
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role as a negotiator by the unavoidable conflicts of
interest within the Department.
The decade and a half since the negotiations took
place have provided a lesson to other tribes that choose
to bargain with their water rights. Changes in the Navajo
Indian Irrigation Project threaten to undo the agreement.^
Federal financial support for the project has been slow and
uneven, while the San Juan-Chama project has moved steadily
to completion.

Time has also shown that the bargain had at

its heart a faulty premise--the desirability of fostering
small agricultural enterprises in the eastern part of the
reservation.

The tribe has come to realize that their

economic future lies more with industrial than agricultural
development.

It has been postulated that the lack of

funding for the project can be attributed to the reduced
power of the Navajo tribe after its primary bargaining
advantage (the priority of its Winters rights) had been
7
relinquished.
A third type of possible agreement involves waiving
of Winters rights entirely.

Public Law 95-328 authorizes

the Secretary of Interior to study the feasibility of certain
water projects providing that the Ak-Chin tribe agrees to

^DuMars and Ingram, p . 22.
^Price and Weatherford, p. 130.
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O

waive its Winters rights.

For that consideration, the

Indians would receive some of the benefits of the development
9
and other economic Incentives.
The options discussed above, and perhaps others,
are available to the Indian tribes In Montana.

Some tribes

are now actively negotiating with the Montana Reserved
Rights Compact Commission, while others, such as the
Blackfeet, have so far steadfastly refused.

In the case of

the Indian water rights Issue In Montana, the strength of
the bargaining position of the parties appears to be largely
unknown.

If the tribes can avoid the pitfalls of the

Navajos, and there Is every Indication that they w i l l ,
their bargaining position may be quite strong.

They are

doing their own negotiation, with the aid of highly skilled
consulting attorneys, rather than relying on the federal
government.

Some of the tribes with reservations on

ancestral lands have the option of using claims for
aboriginal rights as a point of beginning.

All may rely on

the recent supplemental decree In Arizona vs. California.
O

See U.S. Congress, Certain Water Rights Claims of
the Ak-Chln Indian Community: Hearings on S 1582 Before
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 95th Congress, 1st
Session, (1977) .
^"Winters of Our Discontent," p. 1693.
^^Information presented at the Conference on Montana
Water Resources In Great Falls, Montana (October, 1980) by
tribal officials and representatives leaves the Impression
that the Montana tribes have learned a great deal from the
earlier mistakes of other tribes In approaching negotiations
with the State of Montana.
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assuring them that their use of water is not limited to
agriculture.

And some, like the Confederated Salish and

Kootenai tribes, have documentation (Hellgate Treaty of
1855) that reveals the importance of the streams and lakes
of the reservation to the Indian culture.

^^Veeder, p. 635.
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IV.

SOME ELEMENTS OF SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION

Negotiation has been defined as "a process through
which two or more parties try to settle their differences
through give and take, resulting in a resolution of some
conflict between them.”

It is characterized by temporary

and voluntary dickering over the division or exchange of
resources (or perhaps more intangible issues).

Generally,

it consists of a presentation of demands or proposals by one
party, evaluation by the second party, followed by
concessions or counter-proposals by the second party.
The process is then repeated until a resolution occurs or
negotiations break down.^
Negotiators are, by definition, temporarily
adversaries.

A negotiator must be able to place some

reliance on his opponent's information, though he cannot
trust him completely.

He must also appear himself to be

frank and open in order to gain his opponent's trust, but he
must at the same time keep his actual intentions as secret
2
as possible.
Though built upon an adversary relationship,

Mary Ray White, "Negotiating Instream Flows -Course Materials," USDI, Fish and Wildlife Service (1980),

p. 6.
^Ibid., p . 7.
-34 -
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negotiations, if they are to be successful, must be built on
a foundation of understanding, cooperation, and constructive
3
information exchange.
As mentioned earlier, one of the purposes of this
paper is to explore the potential of the Montana reserved
rights negotiation process to succeed at its appointed task.
In order to do so, it is necessary to attempt to define some
of the elements required (or desirable) for a successful
negotiated settlement to occur.
previously,

From the literature cited

(and the author's experience in purchasing

homes, automobiles, and assorted animals through negotiation),
the following list was developed :
1)

All interested groups must be recognized and
accepted.

2)

Each party must be able to expect to gain something,
through compromise, that they could not expect to
readily gain otherwise.

3)

The negotiators must be qualified and have the
authority to compromise.

The parties must be able

to reasonably expect that the compromise will not
be overturned (or overruled) by another party.
4)

The balance of power between the parties must not
be overwhelmingly lopsided.
3

Wassenberg, Olive, Demott, and Stolnaker, "Elements
in Negotiating Stream Flows Associated with Federal Projects,"
USD I, Fish and Wildlife Service Report #FWS/DBS-70/03,
August 1979.
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5)

Each side must be able to acquire enough information
about the other side's needs and preferences to
a good guess

make

of the lowest offer the other side

will accept.
6)

The parties must be aware of the costs of stalemate
and time limits for reaching a settlement.

Although there are other necessary elements, those listed
above raise questions pertinent to the Montana situation.
The eventual outcome of the process will in large part
depend

on the extent to which these elements are satisfied.
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VI.

MONTANA'S NEGOTIATION PROCESS-ARE THE ELEMENTS PRESENT?

The 1979 Montana legislature established the Montana
Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission to interface Indian
and federal reserved water rights with the statewide
adjudication process, also passed in 1979.

The success of

each is dependent on the other--if one collapses, the other
does t o o .

In the nearly two years that the adjudication

process has been in existence, it has often been vigorously
criticized by business interests as a waste of time and
money.

Industrial interests, in particular, have advocated

the repeal of the 1979 amendments, or the entire Water Use
Act.

New, large scale water users such as energy development

industries would benefit most by a return to the chaotic
water rights system that existed in Montana prior to 1973--it
is difficult to deny new water permit requests without any,
or with inadequate, information concerning present use
levels.

Appealing to the natural mistrust of government by

the small farmer and rancher, big business has campaigned
hard to convince them that the adjudication process somehow
jeopardizes their current and future uses of Montana water.
The 1981 Montana legislative session will undoubtedly see

-37-
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an organized effort to scuttle the adjudication process--and
perhaps the Reserved Rights Compact Commission along with

it.i
Assuming for the moment that the process survives,
its success will depend to a large degree on whether or not
the requisite elements of negotiation, as discussed in the
previous section, are present.

Since the negotiation
2
process is expected to take several years,
and is now only
in its very early stages, it is difficult to predict the
problems that the Commission will encounter.

More uncertain

still are the situations that may arise if an agreement
is reached and sent to the Montana legislature and United
States Congress for ratification.

Some predictions can,

however, be made with the information that is available now.
Question # 1 --Are all interested groups recognized and
accepted?
At first glance, it would appear that the parties
to the negotiations are three--state and federal
governments and the Indian tribes.

Obviously, each is

recognized as having a stake in water resource planning
and management in Montana.

Government officials, though,

are not the real parties to the bargaining--they merely
represent most of the actual parties.

The struggle for

^Henry Loble, personal communication, Helena, Montana,
1 Q«n
18 August 1980.
^Ibid.
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equitable shares of Montana’s water is really between
business and agricultural interests, Indian tribes,
consumers, recreationists, and environmental activists
(to name a few).

The role of government officials

should be to enforce the "law of the land," rather than
3
to become advocates for one side or the other.
Unfortunately, that distinction blurs easily when the
topic of discussion is water rights.

State authorities,

for example, are responsible not only for enforcing
state laws, but also for upholding the Constitution and
federal law.

It is a mistake, then, to characterize

the negotiations in Montana as being strictly between
the two levels of government.
As pointed out earlier, the federal government has
not often adequately represented the interests of the
Indian people in its capacity as trustee.

The states

have an even more dismal record--there is much evidence
of the hostility of state administrative agencies and
courts to Indians and their rights.^

Indian tribes are

best represented in the negotiation process by them
selves --as distinct, independent, sovereign (subject to
the Constitution), political communities.
3
Pelcyger, p. 756.
^For a detailed discussion of this evidence, see
Pelcyger, pp. 747-751.
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The composition of the Montana Reserved Water Rights
Commission seems to support a hypothesis that business
and agricultural interests will receive strong support
on the state end of the bargaining table.

Its chairman,

Henry Loble, has spent many years representing business
interests as an attorney specializing in water law.
For those familiar with water politics in Montana, a
quick glance at the composition of the rest of the
Commission reveals an obvious eastern slope agricultural
bent.

5

Only two of the members, Senator Steve Brown

~
:

(Helena) and Representative Daniel Kemmis (Missoula),

;

might be said to represent urban and/or western Montana

:

views on water resource management.

:

Federal agencies, depending on their missions and
the purposes of the reservation involved, represent many
of the groups not obviously represented by the Compact
Commission.

For example, the National Park Service,

and the Forest Service represent primarily recreational,
wildlife and environmental concerns.^

The Water and

Power Service (formally Bureau of Reclamation) and the
Corps of Engineers, on the other hand, are primarily
concerned with providing water storage for crops, power
and flood control.
5

Most interest groups are represented

See Appendix A for a list of Commission members.

^In this context, 'environmental concerns' refers to
natural resource management rather than environmental
preservation.
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to some degree by one or more of the agencies involved.
If the Commission succeeds in its preferred approach
--i.e., negotiating with each Indian tribe and federal
agency more or less independently--there is reason to
believe that most,

if not all, interested groups will be

recognized, accepted, and represented to some degree in
the process.

The probable exception might be anyone

advocating non-use of the water (leave it where it is
because it is there).

Even in Montana, with energy

development sure to explode, there is not likely to be
much unused water leaving the borders in the future.

Question # 2 --Can the parties expect to gain something,
through compromise, that they could not
expect to reach otherwise?
The fact that most potential participants in the
Montana negotiations have expressed a willingness to
enter the process suggests that they perceive a chance
to gain.

For Montana, elimination of uncertainty is

one of the primary goals.

Secondary goals probably

include savings in time and money in the adjudication
process.

The Indian tribes are divided on the wisdom of

negotiation.

The Northern Cheyenne position is that,

realistically, they cannot expect to gain all that they
believe due them--so the sooner quantification takes
7
Henry Loble, personal interview, Helena, Montana,
18 August, 1980.
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place, the more water is likely to be available to them.
They are, therefore, willing to compromise now.

The

Blackfoot tribe, on the other hand, believes that their
legal position is such that they stand to gain nothing,
but lose much, by compromise.

They have, consequently,
o
refused to negotiate with the Commission.
Earlier, President Carter's water policy initiatives
regarding federal reserved water rights were characterized
as a compromise position--the federal government is
committed not to continue to seek the broadest
theoretical extension of its water rights.
is encouraged.

Negotiation

Yet, the policy statement and its accom

panying Executive directives did little to guide the
agencies toward the solution of some of the major issues.
9
Several large questions were left unanswered:
1)

how will reserved rights be administered, and
by whom?

2)

what standards should federal agencies use in
determining quantities of water associated with
their reserved rights?

3)

how will judicial review be obtained?

Q

The Indian positions were presented by tribal
representatives at the Conference on Montana Water Resources,
Great Falls, Montana, October 1980.
^Hillhouse and Hannay , "Practical Implications of
the New National Water Policy," Rocky Mountain Mineral Law
Institute 25 (1979): Ch. 22, p. 48.
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4)

will established water uses which are disrupted
by the exercise of heretofore unused federal
reserved rights be compensated?

The Report of the Federal Task Force of Non-Indian
Reserved Rights made some recommendations toward
resolving these and other issues.

In addition, an

interagency working group has recently been established
to study and make recommendations relating to the
quantification aspects of the Task Force Report.
Until there is some clearer and more precise national
direction, from the President or Congress, it will be
difficult for the federal agencies to define the limits
within which they may compromise.

A willingness to

compromise does not necessarily imply the ability to do
so.
From the State side come conflicting signs.

The

establishment of the Commission was a positive move in
the direction of compromise.

At the same time, however.

State water policy officials have been lending support
to the proposed Roe bill ("Reserved Water Rights
Coordination Act of 1980")^^--a proposal that would, in

U.S., Office of Water Data Coordination, "Draft
Charter--Interagency Advisory Committee on Water Data,"
June, 1980.
^^Gary Fritz (Administrator, Water Resources Division,
Department of Natural Resources and Conservation), personal
interview, Helena, Montana, 7 July 1980.
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effect, leave the states holding most of the cards if it
is ever enacted into law.
Another large question mark concerning the willing
ness of the State interests to compromise involves the
diverse political and philosophical composition of the
Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission.

So

far, the Commission has no formal procedural and
operational bylaws established to define its decision
making process.

Neither does the legislative charter

establish any such bylaws.

As yet, the Commission's

Chairman does not know whether a simple majority or
unanimous consent will be required for determining the
Commission's bargaining position.

12

That simple

administrative detail could make all the difference in
determining the effectiveness of the effort.

For

example, in considering federal instream flow claims,
it could be of considerable importance that one of the
Commissioners, Senator Jack Galt, led the fight in the
1979 Montana legislature to eliminate the State's own
instream flow reservation statute.

Question # 3 --Do the negotiators have the authority to
compromise? Can the parties reasonably
expect that the compromise will not be
overturned (or overruled) by another party?

12

Henry Loble, personal interview, Helena, Montana,
18 August 1980.
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At this early stage of negotiation, there are many
questions and few answers concerning what might follow
a future agreement between the Montana Reserved Water
Rights Commission and an Indian tribe or agency of the
federal government.

By law, any agreement must be

ratified by the Montana Legislature and the United
13
States Congress.

Due in part to the novelty of the

approach, there is little information upon which to
base any serious speculation as to what might happen
in either forum.

Undoubtedly, politicians at both

levels will need to be continually informed of progress
toward reaching a settlement.

The public, too, will

need to be informed so that any agreement does not
come as an unpleasant surprise to any politically active
segment thereof.
Because the Montana process is unique and potentially
precedent setting, the federal bureaucracy is proceeding
cautiously.

To date, it is operating with no clear

Congressional or Executive direction to guide its
efforts.

At the insistence of the MRWRCC, the Secretar

ies of Defense, Agriculture and Interior have each
designated official representatives to the negotiation--a
process that consumed several months in the early part
of 1980.^^

These representatives have been given no

^ & C A 85-2-702.
^'^Daniel Kemmis (Member, MRWRCC) , personal communica
tion, Missoula, Montana, 14 August 1980.
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decision-making authority, so their effectiveness as
negotiators will be limited by their ability to gain
approval of their positions (or definition of their
department's position),

in a timely and orderly manner.

Nor is it even clear whose approval is needed (i.e.,
does each Secretary have full negotiating authority?).
Assuming that the federal representatives are not
hampered by lack of support and/or guidance within their
Department, another unknown is the role that the
Department of Justice will play in the process.

^
To date,

:

Justice lawyers have assumed a "wait and see" attitude --

i:'

that is, they are monitoring the process but taking no

'-t

active role in it.

15

Presumably, they would be involved

at least in an advisory role to the President and/or the
Congress during the ratification process.
If the Justice Department functions only to define
the legal limits of the possible agreements, there may
be no cause for concern by those interested in a quick
negotiated settlement.
however,

There is cause for concern,

if the Justice Department takes an active role

in attempting to define a specific and uniform federal
position, and overly concern themselves with the
possibility that some legal precedent
negotiation process.

may be set in the

The draft Task Force 5a report

^^Ronald Russell, (U.S. Forest Service), personal
communication, Missoula, Montana, 29 September 1980.
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points out numerous examples of the relative inflexibil
ity of the Justice Department in situations that might
compromise I or diminish, the traditional federal water
claims.
1)

For example :

The Justice Department recommended deletion of a
Task Force recommendation that "all federal water
rights once quantified and adjudicated should, as
a practical matter, be subject to administration
by the states.

2)

The Justice Department did not support the Task
Force recommendation that the United States should
participate in state administrative (adjudication)
proceedings whenever the interests of the United
States can be adequately protected.

(Instead, the

Justice alternative maintains that the United States
can only be a party to a judicial proceeding after
being served under the provisions of the McCarren
Amendment).
It seems likely that more and quicker progress will
result if the various federal agencies (or Departments)
and Indian tribes are allowed to negotiate separate
(and perhaps different) agreements, with minimum active

^^Task Force 5a Report (draft), p. 63.
17

Ibid., pp. 59-60.
The McCarren Amendment waives
the sovereign immunity of the United States against lawsuits
in the case of general judicial adjudication proceedings.
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participation by the Department of Justice.
Returning to the state perspective, the MRWRCC
clearly has the authority to negotiate a proposal to
settle the federal water rights question.

It is not

clear precisely how such a compact, once ratified by
both parties, would interface with the statewide
general adjudication process.

The enabling statute

provides that the contents of any compact shall be
Included in the preliminary decree (of a general
adjudication proceeding)
ratified by Congress.

"whether or not it has been
Section 85-2-234 (MCA) states

that "the water judge shall, on the basis of the
preliminary decree and on the basis of any hearing that
may have been held, enter a final decree affirming or
modifying (emphasis added) the preliminary decree.
The statutes in combination appear to imply that the
terms of a ratified compact might be modified by the
District (water) judge in an adjudication proceeding.
Though the chances of such an eventuality are considered
remote by members of the Commission

19

20
and their staff,

it could be considered to jeopardize the realization of
^ % C A 85-2-231
19

Henry Loble, personal communication, Helena,
Montana, 18 August 1980. Daniel Kemmis, personal communica
tion, Missoula, Montana, 14 August 1980.
20

Scott Brown, personal communication, Missoula,
Montana, 30 September 1980,
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some of the Federal government's (and Indians’) primary
purposes for negotiating--to avoid the time, expense,
and uncertainties associated with state judicial
determination of their water rights.

Question # 4 --Is the balance of power between the parties
overwhelmingly lopsided?
Recent history has strengthened considerably the
bargaining position of the State of Montana in dealing
with the federal reserved water rights.

The McCarren

Amendment (43 USC 666) waived the sovereign immunity
of the United States in proceedings initiated in State
courts for the adjudication of water rights.

21

It

established concurrent jurisdiction in both state and
federal courts over federal reserved rights.

At first,

the parameters and requirements which the state systems
needed to meet to adjudicate the United States’
reserved rights were not clearly defined.
Supreme Court decisions

22

But recent

have favored the State of

Colorado's position that state courts, rather than
federal, should quantify federal reserved rights :
Although the Court technically did not
abolish federal concurrent jurisdiction over
^^Task Force 5a Report (Draft), p. 57.
22

United States vs. District Court for Water Div.
No . 5 [401 US 527-(197Ï) I; United States vs. District Court.
f o r Fagle.County [401 US 520 C19/1)1: Colorado River Water
Conservation District, vs. United States'T4'24'"'U5^^Rnn (19761] .
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reserved water rights claims, the opinion reaches
this result in effect by dictating federal
dismissal in deferrence to the state forum in
virtually every case where a comprehensive state
system exists for adjudication of water rights.
In practical terms, Colorado River means that
most, if not all, future court adjudications of
federal reserved water rights will occur in
state courts.23
In Montana, the new statewide adjudication procedure
has been patterned after that existing in Colorado to
enable Montana to begin adjudications involving Indian
and federal reserved water rights.

In an effort to test

the Montana adjudication process, the U.S. Justice
Department filed four suits in U.S. District Court
(April, 1979) to adjudicate the rights of the tribes on
the Fort Peck, Flathead, Rocky Boy's and Fort Belknap
Reservations.

On November 26, 1979, U.S. District Judges

Battin and Hatfield dismissed all of the suits,
preferring to have the rights adjudicated in state
court, and citing the Colorado River decision.
The importance of these developments cannot be over
emphasized.

Combined with the President's "reasonable

standard" language in his water policy initiatives, they
seem to lift the state's bargaining position above the
federal.

Because of the close relationship between

Abrams, p. 1126.
^^Robert D . Dellwo, "Recent Developments in the
Northwest Regarding Indian Water Rights," Natural Resources
Journal 20 (January 1980); 113.
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water rights and economic development, Montana has
strong reasons to construe the scope of federal and
Indian reserved rights as narrowly as possible.

State

courts will have a tendency to do so because of the
inherent conflict between reserved rights and the prior
appropriation system.
Another significant development, again in the United
States Supreme Court, was the decision in United States
25
vs. New Mexico.

The court limited Forest Service

water use under the federal reserved water rights
doctrine through a very narrow interpretation of the
legislation establishing the National Forest system.
The court held that the United States reserved only
such water as is necessary for the preservation (and
growth) of timber and "securance of favorable waterflows."

It also ruled that, although the Multiple

Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960 was intended to broaden
the purposes for which national forests are managed, it
was not meant to reserve additional water with a
priority date of 1897.

That decision also serves to

buttress the state's bargaining position, particularly

^ ^ 9 8 S. C t .

8012 ( 1 9 7 8 ) .

9A
George S. Young, "Reserved Water Rights on National
Forests after United States vs. New Mexico," Utah Law Review,
1979:609, 6 1 0 .
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as it relates to instream uses of water on Federal
lands

Question # 5 --What are the needs and realities that will
define the lowest offer each side will
likely accept?
From the state perspective, by far the most pressing
need is for quantification and prioritization of federal
and Indian water rights.

As pointed out earlier, state

water planning and administration is threatened with
chaos until the responsible agencies can determine how
much water is left for appropriation under state law.
For that reason, the state is unlikely to agree to any
settlement that will leave either existing or future
reserved rights unquantified (at least to some realistic
level of accuracy) within a certain, relatively short,
time period.

To do so, they will probably insist that

the right to use reserved water in the future, if not
quantified and agreed upon in the settlement, be
foreclosed--or at least strictly regulated by the state.
Similarly, any future water right needed for the
federal government on existing reservations not covered
by the agreement will be obtained under state law and
27

On Indian lands, on the other hand, a recent ruling
by a federal appeals court in Colville Confederated Tribes
v s . Walton may have broadened the scope of Indian reserved
rights. While the court found that an instream right for
fish propagation "will not be implied at this time,” it
left the door open for such uses under the implied reserva
tion doctrine.
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procedures.

In establishing priority dates, the state

will probably Insist that no existing state-authorized
water user be Injured, unless fairly compensated, by
existing or future exercise of federal rights.

Thirdly,

the state will likely not give up Its prerogative to
adjudicate all water rights within Its boundaries In
state courts, Including federal and Indian rights under
the McCarren Amendment.

Once quantified and adjudicated,

the state will probably wish to administer all rights
within Its borders --at least to some extent.

28

The federal "bottom line" will likely Include the
following :
1)

Preservation of the prerogative of Congress to
establish new federal or Indian reserved rights,
either on new reservations or by expressly changing
the purposes of existing reservations.

2)

Preservation of the right of the federal judiciary
to adjudicate federal or Indian rights where
manifest unfairness to federal Interests would
result If adjudicated In state court.

3)

Maintenance of sufficient flexibility In quantifying
and administering Indian reserved rights to allow
2R

It Is possible that Montana might relinquish some
degree of administrative control over some types of federal
rights to avoid the costs and manpower needs associated with
administering them.
For example, the state might be willing
to negotiate a set of limits within which Indian tribes or
federal agencies could be free to change the type of use,
point of use, quantity or other aspect of certain water rights.
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federal trust responsibilities toward Indians to
be carried o u t .
4)

A mechanism for the federal government to obtain
sufficient water to carry out its Congressionallyauthorized management functions, even if state law
does not adequately recognize these functions as
legitimate beneficial water uses.

For example, on

certain federal lands, water is needed to protect
recreational,

fish, wildlife, and esthetic values

and to maintain aquatic or riparian ecosystems-though such uses may not be expressly identified as
purposes of the reservation.
The Indian "bottom line" position is a little harder
to define specifically--and will likely vary between
the tribes.

The tribes must ensure that their reserva

tions have sufficient water to allow them to become
viable economic and social entities.

In addition,

cultural and spiritual considerations may well be points
considered non-negotiable by some tribes.
It is the author’s opinion that the parties will be
unwilling to sacrifice the points discussed above to a
negotiated settlement.

The potential "solution space"

or "middle-ground” between these two hypothetical
bottom-line positions is extremely large, so there
should be no barrier to settlement associated with these
positions.

Of course, if either party chooses to take a
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more rigid stand, the chances for settlement may well
decrease accordingly.

Question # 6 --What are the costs of stalemate and the time
limits for reaching a settlement?
The Montana Supreme Court has issued an order under
MCA 85-2-212 requiring that all Montana water users
file a claim with the Department of Natural Resources
and Conservation by January 1, 1982 for all water rights
initiated prior to the passage of the Water Use Act of
1973.

Presumably, that order applies to federal agencies

and Indian tribes as well.

Since most exercised federal

and Indian rights predate 1973 in priority, the law
appears to require that many of the rights to be
negotiated through the Compact Commission must also be
filed by the 1982 deadline, or face being presumed
abandoned in accordance with MCA 85-2-227.

That require

ment not only places a severe time constraint on the
negotiation process (since the basis for establishing
existing rights is still being negotiated), but also
requires that federal agencies and Indian tribes
divide their manpower and dollars to a certain extent
to meet both requirements.

MCA 85-2-217 suspends general

actions to adjudicate federal or Indian reserved rights
until July 1, 1982 while the Compact negotiations are
still on-going.
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In contrast to the state timetable, the (draft)
Task Force 5a report estimated that it might take up to
five years to quantify current consumptive uses of
water, and up to ten years to quantify actual
non-consumptive uses and reasonable foreseeable future
29
consumptive u s e s .

The report attributes much of the

time difference to the lack of well established
methodologies for establishing the latter types of uses.
In most cases involving non-consumptive uses, the
existing methodologies are very site-specific in
nature, and depend on the collection of considerable
hydrological and biological data.

In order for the

federal government to meet the existing state imposed
filing and negotiation deadlines, new (and less
site-specific) procedures will need to be applied.

The

lack of precision associated with such methodologies
will need to be recognized by both sides.
In Montana, the costs of stalemate are difficult to
assess.

Unlike past situations where negotiation has

been successful, there is no particular water project
being jeopardized by the threat of an unproductive set
of negotiations.
reached.

The crisis point has not yet been

The concept of statewide negotiations could

probably be written off as a good, but unworkable, idea
29

Task Force 5a Report (draft); pp. 38, 39.
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if it failed.

But, a return to the situation as it

existed prior to establishment of the Compact Commission
would mean a continuation of the adversary roles played
in the courts for so long (and for so little) by the
parties.

Tension would undoubtedly increase.

The

statewide adjudication process would not go nearly as
smoothly as it would if agreements could be reached.
Expensive and time consuming litigation would likely
be the end result.

Long delays would increase the

possibility that the exercise of federal reserved rights
in the future would impair water rights vested under
state law.
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VII.

A.

NON-CONSUMPTIVE WATER USES ON NATIONAL FORESTS

Backgroijnd
On an individual basis, before negotiations can

begin in earnest, it will be necessary for the Indian tribe
or federal agency involved to establish whether there is
anything to be gained by their participation in the process.
If the Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission
fails completely to recognize as legitimate any of the
"bottom line" federal or Indian positions (discussed in the
previous section), it would not pay for the federal govern
ment or the tribes to dedicate the dollars and manpower
necessary to pursue the negotiations.

For the U.S.D.A.

Forest Service, that determination will be based in large
part on the willingness of the Commission to recognize
non-consumptive water uses on the national forests as
legitimate federal rights.

Consumptive water uses^ comprise

such a small percentage of Forest Service uses (much less
than 1%) that there would be, for all practical purposes,
nothing to negotiate if non-consumptive rights are not

Consumptive water uses are those in which water is
removed from the water body, used (consumed) for some
purpose, and consequently not returned for reuse.

58-
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recognized.

2

That situation is not expected to change much

in the future (in contrast to the situation on Indian reser
vations) .
One school of thought (often held by state water
administrators) maintains that the concept of non-consumptive
(or instream) water rights has no place in the West--where
a right is based upon an appropriation, which is, in turn,
based upon a diversion for beneficial u s e :
A[n] instream flow is not an ordinary usufructory
interest in property, that is, where water is diverted
from nature's design and utilized or made serviceable
by man for his design.
Quite the contrary, [such
claims] are not water rights at all, but simple
exercise of governmental dominion over water that
prevents its usufructory enjoyment.^
The other point of view recognizes the property
interest of the public in general toward maintaining some
water within the stream or lake.

The public trust respon

sibilities of the Forest Service require the agency to
defend that public interest.

To understand the basis for

that Forest Service position, it will be necessary to briefly
discuss the history of the national forest system in the
United States.
The Creative Act of 1891'^ authorized the President
2
Ronald L. Russell (Regional Hydrologist, Forest
Service, Missoula, MT), personal communication, 10 October
1 98 0 .
^Simms, p. 15.
^26 Stat. 1103; 16 USC 471.
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to create national forest reserves by withdrawing them from
the public domain.

As discussed previously, Congress also

implied reserved water in sufficient quantities to fulfill
the purposes for which the national forests were established.
The Organic Administration Act of 1897^ detailed the purposes
of the national forests s
No national forest shall be established, except
to improve and protect the forest within the boundaries
or for the purpose of securing favorable conditions
of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of
timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the
United States.
In 1960, Congress supplemented, or clarified, its
statement of purposes by passage of the Multiple Use-Sustained
Yield A c t .^

The Act states that "it is the policy of

Congress that the national forests are established and shall
be administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber,
watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes.”

Based in part

upon both pieces of legislation, the Forest Service has
historically claimed sufficient water under the implied
reservation doctrine so that "minimum stream and lake levels
(are) adequate to insure the continued nutrition, growth,
conservation, and reproduction of fish and to preserve the
recreational, scenic, and esthetic conditions of the riparian

^30 Stat. 34; 16 USC 473.
^74 Stat. 215;

16 USC 528-531.
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corridors.

Collectively, these purposes have come to be

called "instream" water uses --or non-consumptive uses that
require no physical diversion of water from the stream,
lake or aquifer.

Until recently, the United States has

claimed a priority date for instream water uses as the date
each national forest was reserved from the public domain-normally an excellent priority date in most parts of the
western U.S. (usually before the turn of the century).
The 1978 U.S. Supreme Court decision in United
O

States v s . New Mexico

has caused the Forest Service to

re-examine its reserved water claims for most non-consumptive
uses.

In a 5 to 4 decision, the Court narrowly construed

the purposes of the national forests to include only the
protection and production of timber, and "securing favorable
conditions of water flows."

It concluded that the United

States did not have a reserved right for esthetic,
recreational, wildlife preservation and stock watering
purposes on the Gila National Forest based upon the Organic
Administration Act.

The court also held that, although the

Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960 was intended to
broaden the purposes for which national forests are managed,
7
Master Referee's Final Report, Case-in-Chief: Claims
of the United States covering water rights with the State of
Colorado--Water Divisions 4. 5. and 6 . Cited in R. Scott
Fifer, "Water Law and National Forest Management," unpublished
term paper, Colorado State University (April, 1980), p. 14.
^98 S. C t . 3012 (1978).
Rio Mimbres decision.

Commonly referred to as the
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it was not meant to reserve additional water with a priority
of 1897.^
This decision is often cited by state officials^^
as clear evidence that the federal government has no
non-consumptive water rights unless they are obtained
through state processes and under state law.
however, a number of reasons why a strict,

There are,

literal

interpretation of the New Mexico decision might not be in
the best interests of the state as a "given" in the
negotiation process.
B.

The Nature of the Conflict
First, such a position would be predicated on the

assumption that there is, indeed, a significant conflict
or potential conflict between Forest Service instream water
uses and state authorized uses.

Yet, there is much evidence

to indicate that, in Montana at least, such conflict is far
more imagined than real.

Because of the location of national

forest land--i.e., high in the watershed, above most private
lands --Forest Service instream rights would, in most cases,
help insure delivery of water to downstream users.

In the

Q
Young, p. 615.
^^Gary Fritz (Administrator, Water Resources Division,
Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation),
personal interview, 7 July 1980.
See Simms for a "state
view" of the meaning of the New Mexico decision and the
impacts it should have on national water policy.
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words of one observer,

“59% of the total water (produced in

the eleven coterminous western states) flows from national
forest and national park reservations [and] [u]ntll the law
of gravity Is amended or repealed, most of that water Is
likely to continue to flow."^^

On the other hand, there will

be a few Instances where either existing or future state
authorized uses may be precluded or Interrupted by federal
Instream rights.

There Is an urgent need to Identify such

conflicts now, at least preliminarily, to speed the adjudi
cation process.

The negotiation process offers a unique

degree of flexibility In solving such conflicts, by allowing
agreements on shortage sharing, flexibility in assigning
priority dates, or providing for just compensation to the
Injured party.

A strict Interpretation of the New Mexico

decision, by precluding negotiation with the Forest Service,
would forego the opportunity to Identify and solve the few
conflicts that will exist, without resorting to expensive and
time consuming litigation.
In defining the State's position, It will also be
Important for Montana officials to keep In mind the signifi
cant differences between Montana and New Mexico water rights
situations.

In New Mexico, there Is no recognition of recre

ation, fish and wildlife as beneficial uses of water--there
Is too little water to give such uses any legitimacy In many
areas of the state.

Most, If not all, streams and rivers In

^^Corker, p. 584.
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New Mexico are already over-appropriated.

In Montana, where

unappropriated water still exists, the law wisely recognizes
the importance of instream water uses to the state and its
people.

MCA 85-2-316 authorizes the state or any agency of

the United States to apply to the Board of Natural Resources
and Conservation to reserve waters to "maintain a minimum
flow, level, or quality of water throughout the year or at
such periods or for such length of time as the board desig
nates."

Because of the existence of that law, the state

could argue that federal instream flow rights are unnecessary.
However, a close examination reveals that quantification of
federal reserved rights is needed to strengthen the state
instream reservations.
There are at least two major reasons why the state
reservation process, as it now exists, cannot adequately sub
stitute for federal instream rights on national forest land:
1)

The state water reservation process will likely

take a minimum of 15-20 years to complete.

In the interim,

the day-to-day administration of water use applications,
and the upcoming general adjudications, recognize no other
environmental considerations.

Instream users apparently

have no legitimate claim to water until a reservation is
granted by DNRC under existing state laws.

In contrast to

most other western states, Montana does not have a "public
interest" requirement for issuance of a water use permit.
Such requirements,

in other states, usually allow the water

rights administrator to reject an application for a water
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use permit If it unreasonably conflicts with the "public
interest."

The result of this situation in Montana is that,

if a permit request poses no threat of injury to established
diversionary water rights (in river basins where instream
reservations have not been made ) , state law allows no
IT

discretion--the DNRC must issue the permit.
2)

Since the instream flow reservations were granted

for the Yellowstone River by the Board of Natural Resources
and Conservation (Dec. 1978), the state instream reservation
process has been under attack by business and agricultural
interests.

In the 1979 legislative session, Senator Jack

Galt (a member of the MRWRCC) introduced a bill into the
state senate to eliminate instream reservations altogether.
Though that bill failed, another one passed--which provided
among other things, that instream flows are limited to
50% of the average annual stream flow.

That limitation would

provide insufficient protection to many headwater streams on
national forest land.

The legislative history serves to

illustrate the vulnerability of the state instream flow
reservation process to modification or possible elimination
13
by d e -authorizing legislation.
Based solely on state
legislation, instream rights on national forest land would
have no certainty of tenure.
12

For additional information, see Eagle and Russell,
pp. 11, 12.
13

For more on the 1979 Montana Legislature's
treatment of the state instream flow law, see Eagle and
Russell, pp. 9-13.
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Federal instream rights, if recognized by compact
and subsequently incorporated into the state instream
reservation process, could eliminate or significantly
diminish the two problems discussed above.

Once a compact

is signed, federal instream rights can immediately be
Incorporated into the permit granting and adjudication
processes without waiting for the state reservation process
to reach its conclusion.

Such federal rights would not be

subject to elimination by state legislative action.
If held jointly with state wildlife and water quality
agencies under the state reservation process, federal
reserved rights would strengthen the state's position in
protecting instream values in a large percentage of the
state's prime aquatic habitat and recreational waters.
C.

Weaknesses of the New Mexico Decision
The several weaknesses of the New Mexico decision

itself provide additional arguments against its use to
define the limits of the state negotiating position.

There

is an important distinction to be drawn between the Supreme
Court's approach (in New Mexico) and the approach now
possible through the negotiation process*.
The key to the analysis should not depend on a
search of archaic legislative history.
Rather, it
should depend on an equitable balancing of the
present needs and benefits of the federal reservation
If state ratification of a compact were revoked,
such revocation would, however, render the agreement null
and void.
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with the state’s desire for preÆctability and the
expectations of private appropriâtors under the
law.
The first weakness of the New Mexico decision Is Its
failure to consider the purposes of the national forest as
now perceived.

By limiting itself to the wording of the

1897 Organic Administration Act, the decision Ignores a
substantial body of subsequent legislation that broadens
the original purposes and the management objectives of the
Forest Service.

The Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act (i960),

the National Forest Management Act (1976) and the Wild and
Scenic River Act (1968) are all good examples of explicit
pieces of legislation that belle the Court's apparent
determination that "most national forests

. . . are not

forests In the common meaning of the term, but are more In
the nature of tree farms.

Strictly Interpreted, New

Mexico clearly limits national forest reserved rights
acquired between 1897 and 1960 to the purposes In the 1897
Act.

Justice Powell's dissenting opinion In the case points

out that, although the Court In the majority opinion
"purports to hold that passage of the 1960 (Multiple Use
16

Michael Wrenn, "Water Law--Quantification of
Water Rights Claimed under the Implied Reservation Doctrine
for National Forests--United States vs. New Mexico,
438 US 696 (1978)," Washington Law Review 54 (Oct. 1979)
875.
"Supreme Court Strikes New Balance In FederalState Tension Over Western Water Rights," Environmental
Law Reporter. Vol. 8, No. 9, (Sept. 1978), p. 10182.
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Act) did not have the effect of reserving any additional
water in existing forests,
appears to be d i c t a . A s

. . . this portion of its opinion
such, the question is open for

additional judicial deliberation in future cases, if
necessary.

A reasonable interpretation of the language of

the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act would be that Congress
desired to keep its 1897 priority for the original purposes
outlined in the Organic Administration Act, and at the same
time obtain reserved rights for additional purposes (fish,
wildlife, recreation, etc.), with a priority of 1960.

The

active role of Congress in making appropriations for the
purposes outlined in the 1960 act, and subsequent legislation,
strongly indicate that Congress did indeed intend for the
national forests to be managed for purposes other than
growing trees and transmitting water downstream.

Though,

in many areas of the west, a 1960 priority date would be
virtually worthless --it would be far better than a future
state instream reservation in Montana.
The argument outlined above assumes that the Multiple
Use Act supplemented the purposes of Congress in authorizing
the establishment of national forests.

There is considerable

98 S. C t . 3023, cited in Young, p. 616. The
legal term, "dicta” means an observation or remark made by
a judge in pronouncing an opinion, but not necessarily
involved in the case or essential to its determination.
Such opinions lack the force of adjudication, as they are
considered not to be the professed, deliberate determinations
of the judge.
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evidence to indicate that by passage of the Act, Congress
1o

merely clarified its policies.

There is much to suggest

that Congress has always desired that national forests be
managed as viable, balanced ecosystems.

The language of

the Organic Act, in addition to the tree and water production
mandates, also clearly charges the Forest Service with
improving and protecting the national forests.

19

In the

New Mexico case, the Forest Service had argued that such
protection constituted a third purpose, within which instream
uses would logically fall.

The four dissenting justices

agreed, saying:
. . . the forests consist of the birds, animals, and
fish--the wildlife--that inhabit them, as well as the
trees, flowers, shrubs, and grasses. [We] therefore
would hold that the United States is entitled to so
much as is necessary to sustain the wildlife of the
forests, as well as the plants.
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the National
Forest Management Act of 1976 and numerous Executive Orders
pertaining to the protection of aquatic and riparian
habitats all reinforce this position.

In the New Mexico

case, then, the Supreme Court appears to have seriously
misconstrued the original purposes of the National Forests.
18

Wengert, Dyer, and Deutsch.
"The Purposes of the
National Forests--A Historical R e -interprétâtion of Policy
Development." A Report to the U.S. Forest Service pursuant
to contract by Colorado State University, Fort Collins,
Colorado.
January 1979.
^^See quotation, p. 60 , from Organic Act.
^^Cited in Sally Fairfax and Dan Tarlock, p. 533.
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If the decision stands as a definitive judgment on the
extent of reserved rights, it will be necessary in some
cases for water to be obtained for these purposes by other
means such as condemnation, purchase, special use permit
or easement clauses, or perhaps even through the judicious
application of the "non-reserved" federal rights concept
articulated by the U.S.D.l. Solicitor.
Another weakness of the New Mexico decision is its
failure to recognize other consumptive uses (in addition
to timber growth) as legitimate on national forest land.
The Forest Service has always believed that it possessed
reserved water rights for fostering economic benefits for
both the locality and the Nation as a whole.

Legislative

history supports the use of reserved water for public
recreation, grazing, mining and other consumptive uses.
Many special use and grazing permittees using national
forest land have relied upon Forest Service water rights in
lieu of making application for the rights themselves under
state law.

Fortunately,

in Montana (unlike most other

western states), the Forest Service may still file on such
rights and perhaps have them adjudicated as "use rights"
if established prior to 1973.

However, those individuals

establishing uses after that time, for which they believed
a Forest Service right existed, should not be penalized for
that assumption.
^^Solicitor's Opinion # M36914.
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VIII.

A PROPOSAL--TOWARD DEFINING A
"MIDDLE GROUND"

The previous section develops the point that the
Forest Service has reasonably strong grounds for entering
negotiations with the MRWRCC claiming substantial
non-consumptive water rights--in spite of the Supreme
Court's decision in the New Mexico case.

It also suggests

a number of general reasons why it might be to the
advantage of the State of Montana to recognize all or
some portion of those claims.

Now, the task at hand is to

explore some specific points of negotiation and recommend
solutions that appear, at least potentially, to be mutually
beneficial.
A.

Process
At the outset, as suggested previously, there are

a number of procedural problems that need to be remedied to
assure that negotiations proceed smoothly toward a compromise
These may be summarized as follows :
1)

For greater efficiency, the existing requirement
that federal "use rights" (those established
before 1973) be filed with the Department of
Natural Resources and Conservation outside the
-71-
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negotiation process should be eliminated.

(Or

alternately, only non-consumptive uses might be
excused from filing.

Consumptive uses would then

be filed by the statutory deadline, removing them
from the negotiation process.

Such uses, quite

small in quantity in the case of the Forest Service,
would then be subject to adjudication by the water
judges).
2)

To minimize the possibility that a ratified compact
could be nullified by the state judiciary, the
relationship of the compact to the final decree in
the statewide adjudication process should be
clarified by the Montana legislature prior to or
during ratification of any forthcoming compact.
The Compact Commission, state political leaders,
and state government officials must actively
inform and involve the public, the state Congres
sional Delegation, and special interest groups of
the progress and objectives of the Commission.

3)

Finally, in due course, the Commission should adopt
internal operating procedures to ensure that
differences in the political and philosophical
composition of the Commission itself do not paralyze
its ability to compromise.
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B.

Authority. Beneficial Use, and Priority
One of the primary advantages of negotiation is that

the legal authority for a claim need not be firmly
established in the law for the claim to be recognized as
legitimate.

In other words, the settlement need not follow

legal precedents already established.

Nor do the parties

need to fear the establishment of legal precedent through
their agreement.

The terms agreed to by both parties need

only be mutually beneficial.

So, the MRWRCC should be

receptive to all Forest Service water rights claims
initially.

Then, the final determination of the legitimacy

of the claims should rest on a careful balancing of federal
and state objectives.
In general, Montana law appears to have failed to
recognize water uses without diversions prior to the
passage of the Water Use Act in 1973.^

There is, however,

clear Indication that Congress authorized the Forest Service
to use water in the stream for a variety of purposes prior
to 1973.

Forest Service instream uses should, then, be

considered as "use rights" under Montana law, since they
lawfully commenced prior to the passage of the Water Use
Act.

As a starting point, such rights should, in general,

be considered to have a priority date of 1960--the year of
^For a discussion of Montana law regarding instream
appropriations prior to 1973, see Albert W. Stone, Selected
Aspects of Montana Water Law. Mountain Press Publishing C o .,
(Missoula, M T ) , p. 30.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

74
passage of the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act--unless
otherwise established by specific documentation.
C.

Quantification of Existing Forest Service Rights
Because of the negligible impact of most instream

rights on other users, it is not vital that the exact
j
quantity of every single water right be ascertained.
Nor is it practical to do so within the time limits imposed
by existing state laws--for it would require considerable
site specific data on each and every national forest stream
in Montana.

A more reasonable approach is to establish an

approximation technique, using a variable (by geographic
area) percentage of average annual flow as a maximum claim.
Once established, these formulae could be used to calculate
the approximate instream rights for each stream, at points
either 1) at the national forest boundary or 2) above
existing or state authorized diversions (or other uses).
Those quantities of water so calculated would then be
accepted and adjudicated as Forest Service rights, with the
stipulation that, where there are conflicts with existing
state authorized users, a more site-specific analysis will
be conducted and a better approximation established.

These

conflicts would logically be surfaced during the preparation
of the final decree in the upcoming general adjudications.
There is no reason, however, why existing Forest
Service consumptive water uses cannot be accurately
determined.
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For the purposes of the state, it would seem reasonable that
the new claim be limited to a number less than or equal to
the first approximation.
Using this approach, it is incumbent on the Compact
Commission to establish 1) a procedure for determining the
first approximation of Forest Service instream water rights
and 2) a mechanism for site-specific analysis in the event
of conflict with existing state authorized water uses.

For

this procedure to be effective, the Commission must retain
the authority to make the final determination (which, as an
amendment to the compact, must be agreeable to designated
representatives of both parties).

Only in the event of a

failure to reach a compromise would the judiciary become
involved in adjudicating such rights.
The general adjudication process will identify where
existing Forest Service rights interfere with
existing state authorized uses.

The state water reservation

process, on the other hand, is designed to balance instream
and future consumptive uses.
could

The negotiated agreement

stipulate that, where conflicts surface, site-specific

analyses be conducted during the state reservation process
to replace the first approximation values of Forest Service
instream rights with more specific (and mutually acceptable)
values.

It must be emphasized that the standards and

processes established by the Compact Commission, and not
the state water reservation laws as they exist at the time,
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would of necessity be the governing mechanism for final
quantification of federal instream "reservations."

(For

example, the current limitation on state instream reservations of 50% of average annual flow of record

and the

authority of the Board of Natural Resources and Conservation
to revoke or modify the reservation would not necessarily
apply to federal rights unless such were part of a mutually
defined set of criteria or standards.)
To summarize, all federal non-consumptive rights
would be approximated within a short period of time for
inclusion in the preliminary decree of the statewide
adjudication process.

The quantities so identified in a

ratified agreement would be final determinations, except
l) where conflicts with existing state authorized, or use
rights, are identified and need to be resolved prior to
issuance of a final decree or 2) where applications for
water reservations under MCA 85-2-316 make it apparent that
conflicts with future needs exist.

In both cases, the

Forest Service would be required to conduct site-specific
analyses for streams in conflict using standards established
by the Commission.

The new, or final quantification would

be less than or equal to the original estimate and subject
to agreement by both parties.
The net result of such a process would be to :

^MCA 85-2-316(5).
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1)

Provide initially a reasonable estimate of existing

Forest Service non-consumptive uses (and a precise
quantification of the minor existing consumptive uses) for
purposes of the preliminary decree within the statewide
adjudication.

Such information would not only speed the

adjudication process, but would also be extremely useful
to state water administrators in water resource planning
efforts--both inter- and intrastate.
2)

Provide a final quantification of existing Forest

Service non-consumptive uses at the completion of the first
round of state water reservation determinations under
MCA 85-2-316.

To the extent that state agencies held all,

or portions of, the federal instream rights jointly under
the state law--the state's ability to implement its policy
to "provide for the wise utilization, development, and
conservation of the waters of the state for the maximum bene
fit of its people with the least possible degradation of
the natural aquatic ecosystems"'^ would be strengthened.
3)

Eliminate costly site-specific determinations of

Forest Service non-consumptive water needs where no existing
or foreseeable conflicts exist.
D.

Quantification of Future Forest Service Rights
On existing reservations, once Forest Service

non-consumptive water needs are quantified as discussed in
^Water Use Act [MCA 85-2-101 (Policy)].
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the previous sub-section, there should be no need for larger
quantities of non-consumptively used water.

Further

exercise of reserved rights for such uses could be terminated
by agreement.

If additional needs do occur in the future,

the United States may exercise its prerogative to purchase
or condemn the water that would be needed.

On any new

reservations, the United States should agree to quantify its
water needs at the time of reservation, and limit its
claims to unappropriated water.
There are identified future needs for relatively
small quantities of water for consumptive uses on existing
reservations.
of such needs.

The Forest Service maintains an inventory
The state should consider Forest Service

claims for future consumptive uses up to an agreed upon
cut-off date--perhaps 15 to 20 years.

Claims should

include those for all consumptive uses recognized by the
State of Montana as "beneficial uses"--they should not be
limited to the New Mexico definition of reserved rights.
In other words, the Forest Service would submit claims to
the Commission for future consumptive water needs until,
say, the year 1985 for all of its typical uses (range,
recreation, fire protection, silviculture, wildlife, etc.).
Once an agreement is reached, an upper limit on Forest
Service consumptive use would be established in each river
basin and water requirements in excess of that amount (or
beyond the cut-off date) would need to be obtained under
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state law and through state processes.

That would, in

effect, constitute a relinquishment of unexercised reserved
rights with a grace period during which the Forest Service
could program money and develop its highest priority water
using projects.

From the state perspective, the uncertainty

of the future intentions of Forest Service would be
eliminated.

Federal reserved rights would no longer exist

after the cut-off date--the entire federal rights situation
would then be integrated into the state system.
E.

Reasonable Compensation
In theory, the reservation doctrine means that the

federal government need not compensate for an impaired right
junior to the reservation right.

Professor Frank Trelease

(University of Wyoming Law School) concludes :
. . . The only difference resulting from reliance
on the reservation doctrine instead of a more basic
federal power is that in some cases where the water is
taken from persons who have previously put it to use,
the United States need not pay for the taking. The
reservation doctrine is a financial doctrine and
nothing m o r e .^
In reality, there are few cases where rights of others have
ever been impaired by the exercise of Forest Service reserved
rights.

The Forest Service Manual (FSM 2541) calls for an

analyses of any private rights that might be impaired by
5
Frank Trelease, "Federal-State Relations in Water
Law," National Water Commission. Legal Study No. 5. p t . V
(1971), cited in Richard A. Marquez, "New Mexico's National
Forests and the Implied Reservation Doctrine," Natural
Resources Journal 16 (October 1976);996.
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proposed forest plans, and a consideration for the needs of
other water users.

But, in the scheme outlined above to

quantify all Forest Service rights, there is a likelihood
that a few cases of impairment may occur.

The Commission

should consider a requirement that reasonable compensation
be paid to water users injured by the exercise of federal
rights, and develop standards for determining the amount
of compensation due.
F.

Rights of Forest Service Permittees
It is Forest Service policy that the rights to water

used by permittees on the national forest be held by the
United States in order to maintain management flexibility.^
The agency has long discouraged permittees from filing for
rights in their own name, though some have done so.

The

Forest Service may claim "use rights" in Montana for uses
initiated prior to passage of the Water Use Act (or alter
nately, these rights may be negotiated if the Forest
Service is relieved from the responsibility of filing).
Uses initiated subsequent to 1973, however, present a
problem.

If the Forest Service or the permittee is forced

to file for such rights under state law, the date of
priority would be the date of application rather than the
date of initiation of use.

Since this situation was brought

^Forest Service Manual, FSM 2521.
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about by the Forest Service's reliance on the existence of
reserved rights for those purposes,

it is reasonable that

such rights be negotiated with the Compact Commission.

The

agreement should allow retention of the date of first use
as the priority date.
G.

Administrât ion
Because of the large number of individual uses, and

the small total quantity of water needed by the Forest
Service for consumptive uses --it would save the state
considerable administrative costs and headaches to allow
the Forest Service to administer its own consumptive uses
on national forest land (excluding land not reserved from
the public domain).

For example, changes in purpose of

use, point of use, season of use, etc., need not be regu
lated by the State--though periodic notification should be
required.
On the other hand, the magnitude of Forest Service
instream rights would seem to indicate that the state should
retain control of any changes in purpose or point of use.
The agreement should not allow use of water to be changed
from a non-consumptive to a consumptive use without state
approval.

On the other hand, it would generally be to the

benefit of the state to allow water previously used
consumptively by the Forest Service to be used non-consump
tively in the future.
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IX.

CONCLUSIONS

The Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission
is a new and potentially effective approach toward some
progress (at long last) in federal/state/tribal relations
concerning reserved water rights.

With the passage of the

Water Use Act in 1973, Montana signaled its intention to
remove its head from the sand and make a sincere effort to
recognize and meet its water rights problems head-on.

The

1979 Montana legislature continued in that direction by
establishing the Commission and a system for statewide
adjudications.

The two processes link Indian and federal

reserved rights with state authorized rights.
It is fitting that Montana should be the first state
to embark on this potentially far-reaching effort, since
it was in reference to a Montana case (Winter vs. United
States) in 1908 that the concept of federal reserved rights
was first articulated by the Supreme Court.

Since that

time, little real progress has been made through judicial
or legislative efforts to integrate the concept into
western water law.

The time has come to abandon the

traditional uncompromising federal and state positions, and
seek an equitable compromise.

The best, most efficient,
-82-
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and economical way to accomplish that goal is through
negotiated agreements leading to a set of compacts between
Montana and the Indian tribes and federal agencies
administering

land within its borders.

President Carter's

recent water policy initiatives lend support for that type
of approach.
All federal reserved claims are troublesome to
state water administrators, but there exists a sharp
distinction between Indian and other federal reserved rights.
The trust responsibilities of the federal government in the
two cases are vastly different.

On non-Indian lands, the

government must simply uphold the "public interest.”
Indian rights, on the other hand are private rights--and
thus not subject to diminution in the public interest
without just compensation.
Past history has shown that Indian tribes must be
extremely cautious and knowledgeable before they begin to
bargain with their water rights.

Their future, as a people,

depends on wise decisions concerning their use of water in
combination with other resources.

The tribes should guard

against negotiation from an economic disadvantage, or
allowing the government to negotiate for them.

Ultimately,

the Indian issues may well prove to be the most difficult
to resolve through negotiation.

It is an open question

whether some Indian tribes have anything to gain by negoti
ating with the Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission.
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There is every reason to believe that the Montana
Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission can succeed, to a
large extent, in its goal of "concluding compacts for the
equitable division and appointment of waters between the
State and its people, the several Indian tribes, and the
agencies of the federal government."

A comparison between

the elements needed for successful negotiations and the
Montana situation leads to the conclusion that most, if not
a l l , are present or potentially present (with possible
exceptions in the case of some of the Indian tribes, as
noted above).

If the public is kept informed and allowed

to participate, it seems likely that most interested groups
have the chance to be recognized and accepted.

The

"reasonable standard" language in President Carter's water
policy initiatives indicates, for the first time, a clear
desire on the part of the federal government to compromise.
It is still too early in the negotiation process to determine
if there is a genuine willingness to compromise on the part
of the Commission--though interviews with some of its
members leaves one with considerable optimism.

Of course,

one of the major uncertainties is the ability of the
Commission to convince both the Montana legislature and the
Congress to ratify any future agreement that might be reached
Though the cost of stalemate is a return to the "no
progress" situation of the past, successful negotiations
could fail to materialize if certain "bottom line" positions
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of both sides cannot be agreed upon as starting points.
For the Indians, that means that the state must recognize
their property rights in water and their desires to turn
their reservations into viable economic entities.

For the

federal land management agencies, such as the Forest Service,
that means that non-consumptive water uses, for such things
as wildlife, fisheries, recreation, esthetics and ecosystem
maintenance must be recognized as legitimate federal rights.
Without the legal means to provide water for such uses, the
national forests cannot be managed as the public, and the
Congress have expressly mandated.

Management of such lands

requires the accommodation of the need for change resulting
from shifts in public needs and expectations --a concept not
recognized in the United States vs. New Mexico decision.
Upon examination,

there appears to be a viable

"middle ground" solution to the conflict

between Montana

and the federal government concerning non-consumptive
instream water rights.

In fact, it will likely be to the

advantage of the State to recognize most of such claims,
to help protect many of the resources that Montanans hold so
near and dear to their hearts.

Modernized Montana statutes,

and a more flexible national water policy have provided
the opportunity,

for the first time in a long while, for

improvement of federal-state relations in water rights.

It

now remains for the Montana Reserved Water Rights Commission
to unlock that opportunity.
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APPENDIX C

SELECTED COURT DECISIONS
Winters v s . United States. 28 S. C t . 207, (1908).
Established concept of implied federal reserved water
rights for Indian reservations.
Arizona vs. California. 373 US 546 (1963).
Reaffirmed Winters doctrine, and expanded to non-Indian
federal reservations.
First actual allocation of water
for non-Indian federal reserved lands.
Caeppaert v s . United States. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
Confirms lack of distinction between Indian reserved
water rights and other federal reserved rights.
Articulated the concept that "the implied-reservationof-water doctrine reserves only the amount of water
necessary to fulfill the purpose of the Reservation,
no m o r e •"
United States vs. District Court of Ea^le County, 401 U.S.
520 (1971).
Court held that the McCarran Amendment allowed a state
court to adjudicate federal water rights established
under the implied reservation doctrine.
Colorado River Water Conservation District vs. United States,
96 S. Ct. 1236 (1976).
Court held that state District Court has original
jurisdiction in adjudicating federal water rights,
including Indian water rights.
Colville Confederated Tribes vs. Walton, 460 F. Supp. 1320
'
(Ü.S. District Court, Washington), 1978.
Non-Indian successors in ownership of previous Indian
Reservation do not succeed to Indian reserved priority
date (i.e., reserved water rights on Indian lands are
limited to Indians).
However, the Winter's right that
formerly was associated with the allotment does not escheat
back to the tribe when the allotment is sold to a
non-Indian.
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Supplemental Decree. Arizona vs. Californiat 99 S. C t . 995
(1979).
Although the quantity of water necessary for irrigation
of land on Indian reservations may be the measure of
the quantity of the reserved right, the use of that
water is not restricted to irrigation or other
agricultural application.
United States vs. New Mexico, 98 S. C t . 3012 (1978).
Court found that Congress intended national forests
to be reserved for only two purposes--’’to conserve the
water flows and to furnish a continuous supply of
timber for the people." Therefore, use of water under
the implied reservation doctrine on national forests is
limited to those purposes.
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